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FREE SPEECH AND POLITICAL
LEGITIMACY: A RESPONSE TO ED BAKER
James Weinstein*
Normative discussion too often suffers from lack of
agreement on criteria by which to judge the merits of the various
contending theories. Bereft of such common ground normative
debate often has the deep subjectivity—and hence the
productivity—of schoolyard boasts about whose dog is best. I
was therefore delighted to discover that the normative essence
of the autonomy-based theory of free speech that Ed Baker
1
proposes in this Symposium is political legitimacy, the same
basic norm underlying the somewhat different visions of
participatory democracy that Robert Post and I defend in a
related symposium as the best explanation of the American free
2
speech principle. Having identified this common ground, I will
in Part I of this response attempt to show that there is a firmer
connection between legitimacy and participatory democracy
than there is between legitimacy and the autonomy theory that
Ed proposes. Part II responds to certain of Ed’s claims about the
fit between his theory and current free speech doctrine. Part III
concludes this response with a short discussion of why overall
doctrinal fit matters in determining the best theory of the First
Amendment.
I. LEGITIMACY
A. DEFINITION
As Ed notes, political legitimacy is at least a partial solution
to the age-old problem of justifying the “use of otherwise

* Amelia D. Lewis Professor of Constitutional Law, Sandra Day O’Connor
College of Law, Arizona State University.
1. C. Edwin Baker, Autonomy and Free Speech, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 251 (2011).
2. See Robert C. Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV.
477 (2011); James Weinstein, Participatory Democracy as the Central Value of Free
Speech Doctrine, 97 VA. L. REV. 491 (2011).
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immoral force or coercion to enforce the law”; or, relatedly, and
adopting H.L.A. Hart’s famous distinction, a partial answer to
the question of what conditions are necessary to “obligate, not
4
merely oblige people” to obey the law. But though Ed, Robert,
and I all ground our theories in political legitimacy, none of us so
far in this discussion has explained precisely or in any detail what
we mean by that term. So I will suggest that the term
“legitimacy” in this context has both a descriptive and a
normative sense: descriptively, a legal system is invested with
legitimacy to the extent that citizens obey the laws not just out of
fear of punishment but also out of a sense of duty (or
“obligation,” to use Hart’s term); or if not out of something as
strong as duty, at least because they think that obeying the law is
generally the right thing to do. Normatively, a legal system is
legitimate if it warrants, on moral grounds, the allegiance of its
5
citizens.
Ed’s use of the term in his article for this Symposium
suggests that he is concerned predominately, if not exclusively,
with the normative sense of the term, which may mean that our
mutual reliance on legitimacy provides common ground only
6
with respect to the normative but not the descriptive sense. It
seems to me, however, that these two senses of legitimacy
converge at least at the following point: one reason that citizens
might feel obligated rather than merely obliged to obey the laws,
or at least might believe that obeying the laws is generally the
right thing to do, is their warranted conviction that the legal
system is, on the whole, moral. For this reason, I will consider
both senses of the term in the discussion that follows. However,
in an attempt to find common ground on which to engage Ed, I
will emphasize the normative dimension.
B. LEGITIMACY AND DEMOCRACY
Although ultimately basing his theory in autonomy, it is
significant that Ed recognizes that “[d]emocracy is one answer”
3. Baker, supra note 1, at 262; see also H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 82–
91 (2d ed. 1994).
4. Baker, supra note 1, at 262; see also Hart, supra note 3.
5. This particular phrasing of the normative sense of legitimacy was suggested to
me by my colleague Jeffrie Murphy. See generally Jeffrie G. Murphy, Allegiance and
Lawful Government, 79 ETHICS 56 (1968).
6. There is a third, exclusively positivistic conception of legal legitimacy that
focuses on whether government assumed power in accordance with the system’s rule of
recognition for the transfer of power and, while in power, acts in general accord with the
constitutional rules that define the scope of the powers given to it under the constitution.
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to the question of what can make a legal order legitimate.
Indeed, he even allows that because at least in a formal sense
a democratic process . . . ‘equally’ respects people as properly
having a ‘say’ in the rules they live under. . . . [D]emocracy is
arguably the best that can be done, given the impossibility (or,
at least, lack of pragmatic appeal) of anarchic or completely
voluntaristic social life, for justifying the legitimacy of the
7
social order.

Given this paean to democracy’s legitimating power, why then
doesn’t Ed agree with Robert and me that it is that speech by
which people “hav[e] a ‘say’ in the rules they live under” that is
the primary concern of the First Amendment? He offers three
interrelated reasons for declining to do so: 1) the proper
conception of democracy needs specification in terms of a moral
rather than just a sociological or historical basis; 2) “[t]he
obvious value premise that requires that democracy take a form
that protects people’s political speech is a principle that requires
respect for citizen’s autonomy within the law making process—
that views them as agents with proper claims to selfdetermination as well as having their interest in self-realization;”
and 3) there is “no obvious reason to limit this respect for selfgovernment to collective self-governing—the political sphere—
8
as opposed to self-governing also within private spheres.”
I readily agree that the conception of democracy that
connects free speech and legitimacy needs “specification” in
moral terms. As I will explain in more detail below, the specific
moral basis for the conception of democracy that I believe
underlies the American free speech principle—popular
sovereignty and the individual right of political participation—is
a profound commitment to formal political equality. I also agree
that this moral basis and the two precepts that it generates
require respect for autonomy within the law making process. But
here Ed and I finally arrive at a crucial point of disagreement:
although it may not be “obvious,” there is in my view a very
good reason for confining the respect for autonomy demanded
by political equality, and the specific conception of democracy
that it generates, to collective self-governance.
9
As I have suggested in the related symposium, there are
two separate presuppositions (and accompanying ascriptions) of
7. Baker, supra note 1, at 263 (emphasis added).
8. Id. at 265–66 (emphasis added).
9. See James Weinstein, Participatory Democracy as the Basis of American Free
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autonomy. The first flows from the basic precept that in a
democracy it is the people, both collectively and individually, not
the government, who possess the ultimate sovereignty. This basic
precept would be inverted if the government could restrict
speech on the grounds that the ultimate governors, or some
segment of them, were either too foolish or too dependent to be
trusted to hear the expression of certain views or receive certain
information on matters relevant to their governing authority.
The second presupposition flows from the very reason we would
care about legitimacy in the first place: that people are, as Ed
notes, “agents with proper claims to self-determination . . . [and]
10
interest[s] in self-realization.” It is this second, ubiquitous
presupposition of autonomy that must be respected both within
and outside of the political process. In contrast, since the first
presupposition flows from a precept of popular sovereignty, it
need be respected only when citizens are acting in their
sovereign capacity.
Crucially, these two presuppositions of autonomy differ not
only in the contexts in which they arise but also with regard to
the conditions that can legitimately justify their infringement.
Reflecting the vital connection between popular sovereignty and
political legitimacy, the autonomy presupposed of people
engaged in democratic self-governance can properly be
11
infringed, if at all, only in extraordinary circumstances. In
contrast, as I shall discuss in detail below, in most cases no
disrespect for the ubiquitous presupposition of autonomy arises
if government has good reason for its infringement.
Though he does not say why, Ed obviously does not agree
with my view that the presupposition of autonomy relevant to
collective self-governance differs from the more minimal
presupposition of autonomy that must be ascribed to people in
all other capacities. But having noted this crucial point of
disagreement, I will now move on to what Ed calls his “more
direct affirmative argument” for autonomy as the basis of a
12
theory of free speech, which, as we shall see, will ultimately
bring us back to the crucial point of disagreement.

Speech Doctrine: A Reply, 97 VA. L. REV. 633 (2011).
10. Baker, supra note 1, at 265.
11. See Weinstein, supra note 2 at 498–99, 508–09.
12. Baker, supra note 1, at 267.
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C. IN SEARCH OF THE CONNECTION BETWEEN FORMAL
AUTONOMY AND LEGITIMACY
According to Ed, “[t]he legitimacy of the legal order
depends, in part, on it respecting the autonomy that it must
13
attribute to the people whom it asks to obey its laws.” The
autonomy that Ed is concerned with is formal autonomy,”a
person’s authority (or right) to make decisions about herself—
her own meaningful actions and usually her use of her
resources—as long as her actions do not block others’ similar
14
authority or rights.” Although such autonomy obviously
includes a lot more than speech, this sense of autonomy does, as
Ed asserts, readily “encompass self-expressive rights that
include, for example, a right to seek to persuade or unite or
associate with others—or to offend, expose, condemn, or
15
disassociate with them.” Although the connection between
formal autonomy and speech may be apparent, the connection
between respect for such autonomy and legitimacy is not.
Specifically, I do not believe that Ed persuasively explains how
the “legitimacy of the legal order” depends on government
respecting formal autonomy. More crucially, he does not explain
why restrictions justified by good and substantial reasons fail to
respect this autonomy.
Ed attempts to tie his view of autonomy to legitimacy as
follows: After rejecting Kantian notions of consent or selfauthorship because they give those who dissent from a given law
or an entire legal regime too much power over others, Ed
concludes that:
[T]he most that moral theory should expect of the majority,
those prepared to back their law with force, is that they
propose only laws or projects for which they can in good faith
give reason to the dissenter for why she could and, the
16
majority argues, should accept these laws.

This requirement “is an implicit premise of discourse, that is, of
17
communicative action.”

13. Id. at 251.
14. Id. at 254. Ed contrasts such formal autonomy with substantive autonomy,
which he defines as a person’s “capacity to pursue successfully the life she endorses—
self-authored at least in the sense that, no matter how her image of a meaningful life
originates, she now can endorse that life for reasons that she accepts.” Id. at 253.
15. Id. at 254.
16. Id. at 267.
17. Id.
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1. The Overlapping Consensus Between Formal Autonomy
and Participatory Democracy
To the extent that the focus of Ed’s theory is with
“discourse” or “communicative action” by which “the majority
. . . in good faith give[s] reasons to the dissenter for why she
could . . . accept . . . laws,” Ed’s theory, like Robert’s and my
participatory democracy theories, focuses on the process
necessary to make a particular law or the entire legal system
legitimate. Moreover, just as our participatory democracy
theories ascribe autonomy to those engaged in the project of
democratic self-governance through public discourse, Ed’s
requirement that dissenters be given reasons properly
presupposes that these dissenters, as well as the majority with
whom they are in dialogue, are autonomous agents. Ed notes the
possibility of an overlapping consensus by which our differing
18
theories protect public discourse.
Unlike a theory based in democratic participation, however,
Ed’s theory also embraces communicative acts that have nothing
to do with the process by which laws or social policy are
adopted. Rather, as Ed makes clear the “communicative action”
central to his theory concerns “a process by which people seek
agreement” not just about public decisions through public
discourse but also includes private discussion “such as ones in
19
which a group of friends try to decide where to go to dinner.”
Consistent with this more expansive view, autonomy is ascribed
to those engaged in the practice of seeking agreement on all
matters whether public or private. The connection between
respect for this broader conception of agreement-seeking
communicative action and legitimacy is, however, obscure. And
to the extent that his theory embraces communicative activity
not part of the practice of seeking agreement, the connection
with legitimacy through the autonomy presupposed for those
20
involved in communicative action is completely severed.

18. Id. at 269.
19. Id. at 267.
20. Ed’s concept of formal autonomy also embraces activity that is noncommunicative. However, for reasons of legal positivism, among others, Ed does not
maintain that these activities are protected by the First Amendment. See Baker, supra
note 1, at 256–57.
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2. COMMUNICATIVE ACTION AS PART OF THE PRACTICE
OF SEEKING AGREEMENT ON PRIVATE MATTERS
Since the concept of seeking agreement with someone with
no authority to reject a proposal or to ask for its modification
would seem nonsensical, I concur with Ed that the
communicative action by which people seek agreement on
private as well as public matters presupposes that those engaged
in this process are autonomous agents. In addition, I agree that
government should respect the presupposition of autonomy
inherent in this practice. I will even grant for the sake of
argument that laws or regulations that fail to respect this
autonomy are illegitimate and, further, that restrictions on
autonomy imposed for insufficient reasons do not respect this
autonomy. Crucially, however, at least for most exercises of
formal autonomy, if government does have good and substantial
reasons for restricting this autonomy, it does not act
disrespectfully, and thus the regulation is not illegitimate, at least
not on the ground that it disrespects people’s formal autonomy.
A fortiori, substantially justified infringement of such autonomy
does not undermine the legitimacy of the entire legal system.
To adopt (and modify slightly) one of Ed’s examples:
Suppose that Alice convinces Carol, Betty’s spouse, that Betty is
21
worthless, and persuades Carol to leave Betty and live with her.
Suppose further that, based on this communicative action, Betty
recovers a judgment against Alice for alienation of affection.
Such a judgment would obviously infringe Alice’s formal
autonomy. In addition, the imposition of legal liability for such
conduct may be perfectly lousy social policy (not to mention at
odds with the progressive domestic relations policy of a state
that recognizes same-sex marriage). Therefore, most, though not
22
all, states have abolished this cause of action. But it is not at all
clear how alienation of affection laws are themselves
23
illegitimate, let alone undermine the legitimacy of the entire
legal system.
21. See id. at 254–55.
22. Seven states—Hawaii, Illinois, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South
Dakota, and Utah—currently retain such laws. See Sheri Stritof & Bob Stritof, Alienation
of Affection State Laws, ABOUT.COM, http://marriage.about.com/od/legalities/a/
alienation.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2011).
23. If the reasons offered by the state to justify the restriction were relatively weak
as compared to the importance of the autonomy interests infringed, as may well be the
case with respect to applications of alienation of affection laws such as hypothesized
here, then this restriction would arguably fail to respect formal autonomy, thereby
rendering it illegitimate. See note 30, infra.
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Someone who has wooed away another’s spouse would no
doubt resent being hit with a judgment for alienation of
affection. With regard to the descriptive dimension of legitimacy,
I doubt that for most people that the primary or even a
significant reaction engendered by such judgment would be
decreased allegiance to the state’s legal system. Similarly, from a
normative perspective, such a judgment is not in my view the
type of restriction that undermines the moral basis that warrants
allegiance to the legal system. In contrast, if this same state
passed a law that prohibited anyone from advocating abolition of
this state’s alienation of affection law, I do think that allegiance
24
to this state’s legal system would, and should, be diminished for
25
those barred from expressing their views on this matter.
Indeed, the moral underpinnings warranting allegiance to the
legal system might be diminished even for those who oppose or
are undecided about abrogation of such suits but who are
committed to fair and open debate on this and other public
policy matters.
Having not taken a poll on the issue, my assertion that, as a
descriptive matter, a judgment for alienation of affection would
undermine the legitimacy of the legal system, if at all, far less
than a prohibition of advocacy a particular viewpoint on a

24. I use the word “diminish” advisedly. Thus a single viewpoint restriction on
public discourse usually would not significantly undermine the legitimacy of the entire
legal system but rather, to borrow Robert Dahl’s metaphor, would tend to reduce the
level of the legitimacy “reservoir.” See ROBERT A. DAHL, POLYARCHY: PARTICIPATION
AND OPPOSITION 148–49 (1971). In contrast, even an isolated viewpoint-discriminatory
restriction on public debate can render illegitimate the application of a law to any person
excluded from participating in the public discussion of that law. See Weinstein, supra
note 2, at 498.
25. In accordance with the scope of our respective claims, the proper comparison
here is between restrictions on formal autonomy without limitation, and viewpoint-based
restrictions on public discourse, rather than all restrictions on public discourse. For while
Ed claims that virtually all restrictions on such formal autonomy are illegitimate, I make
no such claim with respect to all restrictions on public discourse generally. For one, in
accord with current doctrine, my view is that content-neutral regulations are both
constitutional and legitimate unless they impose a burden on citizens’ right to participate
in public discourse that is both substantial and greatly disproportionate to the asserted
state interest justifying the restriction. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781
(1989). And while for pragmatic reasons, I support the Court’s view that virtually all
content-based restrictions on public discourse are unconstitutional, I do not believe that
all such restrictions are always illegitimate. Rather, I agree with Justice O’Connor’s
observation that the rule against content-based regulation of public discourse sometimes
results in the invalidation of laws that “common sense may suggest . . . are entirely
reasonable.” City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 60 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
But I also agree with her that such a rule is nonetheless a good one “in an area where
fairly precise rules are better than more discretionary and more subjective balancing
tests.” Id.
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matter of public concern, is, admittedly, based on little more
than a hunch. I realize that this is a hunch that other reasonable
observers, including some participants in this Symposium, might
not share. Similarly, so far I have appealed primarily to intuition
in asserting that, as a normative matter, alienation of affection
judgments compromise, if they do it all, the moral basis
warranting allegiance to the legal system far less than a provision
prohibiting advocacy of abolition of such suits. Others, however,
might not share this intuition. Since merely trading hunches and
intuitions risks the “my dog is better than your dog” type of
argument that I had hoped to avoid, I will now try to advance
the inquiry by giving specific reasons why there is a more robust
connection between participatory democracy and political
legitimacy than there is between formal autonomy and such
legitimacy.
First, and most obviously, rules that constitute or directly
affect the legal system, such as voting or election procedures, or
limitations on the discussion through which public opinion is
formed, will because of their systemic nature tend to have a
greater bearing on the legitimacy of the legal system as a whole
than will non-systemic rules such as those restricting most
exercises of formal autonomy. Relatedly, so long as fair and
open political processes exist, the possibility of repealing
illegitimate laws not related to the political process remains
open. Conversely, illegitimate restrictions on the political
processes will make repeal of other types illegitimate laws much
more difficult.
More profoundly, measures that selectively restrict the
ability of certain individuals or groups to participate in the
political process violate the fundamental precept of equal
citizenship underlying contemporary visions of democracy. As
Robert Dahl has explained: “The democratic process is generally
believed to be justified on the ground that people are entitled to
participate as political equals in making binding decisions,
enforced by the state, on matters that have important
26
consequences for their individual and collective interests.” It is
such a commitment to formal political equality that provides the
27
moral “specification” for the conception of democracy that I
believe underlies the American free speech principle. Whatever

26. ROBERT A. DAHL, CONTROLLING NUCLEAR WEAPONS: DEMOCRACY VERSUS
GUARDIANSHIP 5 (1985).
27. See supra, text accompanying note 8–9.
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may have been thought in times past, it is now a basic American
precept that every competent adult member of society has a
fundamental right to participate in the process by which society’s
28
collective decisions are made, and as a formal matter at least,
has a right to do so on an equal basis with all other citizens.
Indeed, this norm of equal formal participation has become so
deeply entrenched in our political culture that its violation is
seen as a denial of the equal moral worth of any individual
excluded from this process. For this reason, such exclusion for
public debate is likely to be regarded as deeply insulting.
Moreover, if some are selectively excluded from voting, or
29
even have their voting power diluted by malapportionment, or
are barred from expressing their views on matters of public
concern—be it the war in Iraq, health care reform, same sex
marriage, or a proposed tax hike—such a restriction is likely to
be perceived as fundamentally unfair. And here I want to
suggest that of the various moral pillars that support the
legitimacy of a legal system, fundamental fairness is particularly
crucial. Thus, laws that are, or are perceived to be,
fundamentally unfair are especially corrosive of the moral
foundation warranting citizens’ allegiance to the legal system.
Viewpoint-based restrictions on public discourse are, and are
likely to be perceived by those selectively silenced as, grossly
unfair. In contrast, fundamental unfairness is not the evil usually
associated with restrictions on formal autonomy such as laws
penalizing alienation of affection.
In the final analysis, then, it is the insult and profound
unfairness produced by denials of political equality, together
with their essential connection with the legal system, that render
viewpoint restrictions on public discourse particularly corrosive
of political legitimacy. And it is these considerations that make
such viewpoint discrimination categorically more destructive of
legitimacy than are infringements of formal autonomy.
This is not to deny that some restrictions on formal
autonomy might be illegitimate because they fail, as Ed argues,
to respect the autonomy that must be attributed to the people
28. One remaining exception from this modern muscular commitment to political
equality is the ability of states to constitutionally disenfranchise convicted felons. See
Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
29. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Simms, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964) (in announcing one
person, one vote standard the Court explains that “[f]ull and effective participation in
state government requires . . . that each citizen have an equally effective voice in the
election of members of the state legislature”).
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30

whom government asks to obey its laws. It may even be the
case that, like viewpoint-discriminatory restriction on public
discourse, a small subset of these restrictions might tend to
31
corrode the legitimacy of the entire legal system. Still, in sharp
contrast to virtually any viewpoint-discriminatory restriction on
public discourse, many restrictions on the vast array of liberty
interests encompassed within Ed’s vision of formal autonomy
are not illegitimate in themselves, and even more certainly do
not implicate the legitimacy of the legal system. This is true even
of restrictions on agreement-seeking communicative action, let
alone all other exercises of formal autonomy.
A defamation suit by a private person on a matter of private
concern provides a good example of infringements of formal
autonomy with no negative implications for political legitimacy.
Assume that Andy tells Bob that he should shun Charlie, a
newly-admitted member of their social club, because Charlie
regularly beats his wife, an accusation that turns out to be false.
Assume further that Charlie is neither a public official nor a
public figure, and that although Andy acted negligently in
making this false accusation, he did not know that the allegation
was false, nor did he act in reckless disregard of whether it was
false or not. Andy’s condemnation of Charlie fits squarely within
Ed’s definition of communicative action. Thus contrary to
current doctrine, which would allow Charlie to recover damages
32
from Andy, Ed believes that at least in the absence of proof
30. This might be the case if a law infringed an exercise of formal autonomy based
upon some relatively weak justification, such as was the case with the ban on homosexual
sodomy struck down in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). Accord Baker, note 1 at
256. The alienation of affection judgment that I hypothesized in text, an activity that even
more clearly involves communicative action than does sexual conduct, might, arguably,
be another example. See note 23, supra. It is telling, however, how difficult it is to come
up with actual restrictions on communicative action, or even realistic hypothetical ones,
outside of public discourse that, by my lights at least, would clearly be illegitimate in
themselves, let alone undermine the political legitimacy of the legal order.
31. The ban on homosexual sodomy invalidated in Lawrence might again provide
an example, at least for the class of people targeted by the law. Interestingly, however,
such arguable corrosion of the political legitimacy of the legal order likely results as
much, if not more so, from the discriminatory aspect of that law, which applied to acts of
homosexual but not heterosexual sodomy. (Cf. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579–86 (O’Connor,
J., concurring) (arguing that the law should be invalidated as violating equal protection
not due process)). This view is consistent with my suggestion in text that the deeper
norms underlying political legitimacy are commitments to formal political equality and
fundamental fairness. Violation of other norms besides formal autonomy and formal
equality might also undermine the legitimacy the legal system. For example, violation of
respect for basic human dignity through the routine use of judicial torture would
obviously compromise the legitimacy of the legal order.
32. Assuming that the statement was not deemed a matter of public concern, which
would be likely, Charlie could recover even in the absence of a showing of fault on
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that Andy acted in knowing or reckless disregard for the truth,
allowing Charlie to recover for Andy’s defamatory statements
would violate the First Amendment because such recovery
would fail to respect the autonomy of people engaged in
33
communicative action.
There can, of course, be reasonable disagreement as to what
level of protection, if any, the First Amendment should provide
defamatory speech such as Andy’s. But in light of Charlie’s
important substantive autonomy interests that would likely be
compromised by the spreading of this false information about
him, including being shunned, it is difficult to comprehend how
allowing him to recover damages from Andy is illegitimate in
itself, let alone diminishes the moral basis that warrants
allegiance to the legal system. Indeed, it could be more plausibly
argued that not allowing Charlie to recover damages for Andy’s
culpable and harmful conduct will tend to corrode the moral
underpinnings of the legal system.
So even if Ed is right that “[t]he legitimacy of the legal
order depends, in part, on it respecting the autonomy that it must
34
attribute to the people whom it asks to obey its laws,”
government does not fail to respect this autonomy when it has
good reasons, which will often involve protecting the substantive
autonomy interests of others, for restricting exercises of formal
35
autonomy. In contrast, reflecting the essential connection
between public discourse and political legitimacy, governmental
interests far more pressing and urgent are needed to justify
36
viewpoint-discriminatory restriction on public discussion. For

Andy’s part. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 760–
61 (1985) (plurality opinion); id. at 764 (Burger, C.J., concurring in the judgment); id. at
774 (White, J., concurring in judgment). But even in the unlikely event that Andy’s
statement were found to be on a matter of public concern, Charlie could still recover
upon showing that Charlie acted negligently. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 346 (1974).
33. See Baker, supra note 1 at 282 n.62.
34. Id. at 251 (emphasis added).
35. The constitutionality of content-neutral regulations on public discourse are
judged by a not dissimilar standard. See supra note 25.
36. Even if not viewpoint based, content-based restrictions on public discourse are
subject to strict scrutiny. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime
Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 115–16 (1991). And since “[w]hen the government targets not
subject matter, but particular views taken by speakers on a subject, the violation of the
First Amendment is all the more blatant,” Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the
Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995), viewpoint-discriminatory restrictions are
especially anathema to the First Amendment. Indeed, the better view may be that such
restrictions are never permissible.
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as Learned Hand recognized nearly a century ago, even an
interest as vital as preventing interference with the war effort is
not sufficient reason for suppressing anti-war protests in
democratic societies “dependent upon the free expression of
38
opinion as the ultimate source of authority.”
3. Other Communicative Acts
The formal autonomy embraced by Ed’s theory extends not
just to communicative action by which people seek agreement
but to many other forms of communication as well. It
encompasses, for instance, “self-expressive rights that include,
39
for example, a right to . . . offend, or condemn,” not only as part
of public discourse or to seeking agreement on matters of private
concern, but also to face-to-face insults, so-called “fighting
40
words.” But by including such communication, Ed’s theory not
only becomes further attenuated from its purported legitimacy
touchstone but also encounters a logical problem.
Ed seems to believe that if autonomy is properly
presupposed for people engaged in seeking agreement through
communicative action, then this presupposition must carry
forward the very different types of communicative activity (and
even to non-communicative exercises of formal autonomy). But
why should this be? Whether there is a presupposition about a
particular practice should, it seems to me, depend entirely on the
nature and function of that practice. Accordingly, as I have
41
previously discussed at some length in the related symposium
and more briefly above, a basic presupposition of popular
sovereignty that people are autonomous and rational when
engaged in democratic self-governance should not automatically
carry over to people acting in other capacities such as consumers
37. Masses Publ’g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 539–40 (S.D.N.Y.), rev’d, 246 F. 24 (2d
Cir. 1917).
38. Id. Admittedly, part of the explanation for the virtually absolute prohibition of
viewpoint-discrimination in public discourse is the warranted skepticism of attempts by
government to suppress speech critical of it or its policies, skepticism that is usually not
as justified for restrictions on most liberty interests, including exercises of formal
autonomy. Still, as Hand suggests, suppression of antiwar speech would not be defensible
even if it were a moral certainty that widespread public opposition to a war would result
in increased death of American troops. Id.
39. See Baker, supra note 1, at 254.
40. See id. at 278, which seems to imply that Ed considers “fighting words”
protected by his theory. In any event, such expression would seem to be fall squarely
within the scope of his definition and explication of formal autonomy. See supra, text
accompanying notes 14–15.
41. See Weinstein, supra note 9, at 670–72.
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of commercial products or as medical patients. Similarly, the fact
that government must respect the presupposition of autonomy
inherent in the communicative acts of people seeking agreement
would not seem relevant to whether government must also
respect the autonomy of people involved in communicative
activity not relevant to this practice.
There may well be reasons, independent of the
presupposition proper to agreement-seeking communicative
action, why government must respect the formal autonomy of
people engaged in communication that is not part of the practice
of seeking agreement. But in the absence of such an argument,
Ed’s argument that restrictions on such communication are
illegitimate would seem to have a hole in it. And consistent with
this logical lacuna, it is not surprising that concrete examples of
restriction of speech not part of the practice of seeking
agreement reveal an even more attenuated connection with
legitimacy than is the case with restrictions on agreement
seeking-communication.
Suppose, for instance, that in an exercise of his formal
autonomy, a white man walks up to a black man waiting for the
bus and calls him a “dirty nigger.” It is plausible (though I
believe mistaken) to maintain, as does Ed, that face-to-face
insults such as this should be constitutionally protected. But it is
implausible to maintain that a law preventing someone from
engaging in such expression undermines the legitimacy of the
legal system. As with defamation on matters of private concern,
both the utterer and the target of this expression have moral
claims sounding in autonomy. For this reason, it is difficult to see
how prohibiting the speaker from verbally attacking a fellow
citizen in this way is illegitimate in itself, let alone undercuts the
moral basis warranting allegiance to our legal system.
In summary, when we consider the entire gamut of
communicative acts embraced by Ed’s vision of formal
autonomy, those part of the practice of seeking agreement as
well as those outside that practice, the connection with
legitimacy is remote. Restrictions on some of these
communicative acts outside of public discourse may arguably
raise legitimacy concerns in themselves, and a few may possibly
even threaten the legitimacy of the entire legal system. In
contrast, virtually any viewpoint-discriminatory restriction on
public discourse—whether about such monumental issues as
race relations, the war in Afghanistan, health-care reform,
abortion or global warming, as well as more mundane issues
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such as where a new stop light should be placed—denies the
equal moral status of those so excluded from participation in the
political process. For this reason, such restrictions are
particularly likely to corrode the moral foundations warranting
allegiance to the legal system. So with respect to the task of
guarding political legitimacy, my dog Demo is better than Ed’s
dog Auto.
II. FORMAL AUTONOMY AND DOCTRINAL FIT
Ed contends that the appeal of a theory of constitutional
theory should be judged by “the quality of its explanation of
those aspects of existing doctrine that should be approved and,
while linking meaningfully to existing constitutional discourse,
the persuasiveness of its critique of aspects of doctrine that
42
should be rejected.” Accordingly, although he denies that a
theory’s overall fit with current doctrine argues in favor of a
theory, Ed spends considerable effort attempting to show how
well his autonomy theory explains key areas of doctrine of which
he approves. But even this attempt to demonstrate limited
doctrinal fit is unpersuasive and the overall fit between his
theory and contemporary doctrine is remarkably poor.
A. ED’S EXPLANATION OF DOCTRINE OF WHICH HE
APPROVES AS VINDICATING FORMAL AUTONOMY
1. Compelled Speech
According to Ed “[t]he poster child” for doctrinal fit with
formal autonomy is the West Virginia State Board of Education
43
v. Barnette, the World War II era case holding that public
school children cannot constitutionally be compelled to salute
44
the flag. There is, it is true, language in that case emphasizing
45
such autonomy. But despite this language, a commitment to
formal autonomy with the robustness and breadth that Ed claims
for it cannot possibly have been at play in that case. For instance,
it is inconceivable that the Barnette Court (or any Court before
or since) would have recognized the constitutional right of a
public school child to refuse to recite a poem that offended the

42. Baker, supra note 1 at 270.
43. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
44. Baker, supra note 1 at 270–71.
45. 319 U.S. at 642 (noting that in compelling the flag salute, government “invades
the sphere of intellect and spirit”).
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child’s aesthetic sensibilities. (“I’m sorry Miss O’Grady, but
being required to recite drivel such as ‘Stopping by Woods’
disrespects my autonomy; I would, however, agree to recite one
of Tennyson’s better works. Otherwise, please speak to my
lawyer.”) And recent Supreme Court cases confirm that school
46
children have no such far-reaching autonomy rights.
Ed also attempts to explain in terms of formal autonomy
47
Wooley v. Maynard, which held that a motorist has a First
Amendment right to cover up New Hampshire’s state motto
48
“Live Free or Die” on his license plate. But as confirmed by the
Court’s repeated reference to the “ideological” or “political”
49
content of the compelled expression at issue, Wooley cannot
plausibly be read as recognizing a similar right of a motorist to
object on aesthetic grounds to the color of the license plate that
the state requires to be affixed to his automobile, as would
follow if this decision had vindicated the formal autonomy
interests that Ed contends underlies the First Amendment.
2. The Rule Against Content Discrimination
Although its scope of operation is often grossly
exaggerated, the rule against content discrimination is
nonetheless unquestionably a centerpiece of modern free speech
doctrine. Therefore, a good test of any theory’s doctrinal fit is its
ability to explain the purpose and scope of this rule. As do
Robert and I, Ed seems to recognize that the rule does not
50
extend with the same rigor to all settings. Ed does not,
46. See, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Frazer, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Hazelwood
Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
47. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
48. Baker, supra note 1, at 271 n.30.
49. See, e.g., 430 U.S. at 713 (“We are thus faced with the question of whether the
State may constitutionally require an individual to participate in the dissemination of an
ideological message by displaying it on his private property in a manner and for the
express purpose that it be observed and read by the public.”); id. at 714 (“A system
which secures the right to proselytize religious, political, and ideological causes must also
guarantee the concomitant right to decline to foster such concepts.”).
50. See Baker, supra note 1, at 280–81. Because Ed’s discussion of the rule against
content discrimination is limited to speech on government property, my response is also
limited to those contexts. However, following Robert’s seminal work on the subject (e.g.,
ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT
200–01 (1995)), I have elsewhere attempted to show more generally that this rule exists
primarily within contexts dedicated to democratic self-governance. See, e.g., JAMES
WEINSTEIN, HATE SPEECH, PORNOGRAPHY AND THE RADICAL ATTACK ON FREE
SPEECH DOCTRINE 40–43 (1999). This larger point is neatly made in the related
symposium by Robert’s contrasting the First Amendment protection afforded a dentist
who publicly disagrees the American Dental Association’s policy against dentists
advising their patients to have their mercury amalgam filings replaced, with the lack of
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however, attempt, as we do, to explain the Court’s fierce but
limited antipathy to content discrimination by positing that the
rule operates primarily within settings dedicated to democratic
self-governance, such as in a traditional public forum, but not in
settings dedicated to other purposes, such as courtroom or
51
government workplace. Rather, Ed attempts to explain the
wavering pattern of protection by arguing that respect for formal
autonomy requires government to allow speech on public
property and “institutionally bound” speech unless it is
“basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular
52
place at a particular time,” citing the Court’s 1972 opinion in
53
Grayned v. City of Rockford. The problem with Ed’s
explanation, as a descriptive matter at least, is that time and
doctrine have passed it by.
In the early 1970s the Court did, as recited in Grayned,
fleetingly embrace an “incompatibility” standard. Just a couple
of years later, however, the Court was already backing away
54
from this standard, and by 1983 it had completely changed
course, adopting instead a rigid, categorical approach in Perry
55
Educ. Assoc. v Perry Local Educators’ Assn. Perry’s tripartite
division of public property includes the speech-limiting concept
56
of the “non-public forum,” settings in which government has
extensive authority to regulate both access to the forum and the
content of speech in ways patently inconsistent with the flexible
57
“incompatibility” standard described in Grayned.
The same term that it decided Perry, the Court also handed
58
down Connick v. Myers, which held, with one important

protection for the same dentist who advises her patient to have such filings replaced. See
Robert C. Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477, 481-82
(2011).
51. Also, as I discuss in note 24, above, the rule against content discrimination is
best understood as strategic overprotection against viewpoint discrimination.
52. Baker, supra note 1, at 280.
53. 408 U.S. 104 (1972). Though Grayned dealt with a content-neutral ban on access
to public property (upholding an anti-noise ordinance applicable to property adjacent to
schools), it is fair enough that Ed uses that decision’s incompatibility approach for
measuring the validity of all restrictions for speech on public property, including contentbased restrictions in the workplace and other “institutionally-bound” contexts.
54. See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
55. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
56. Recently, and confusingly, referred to in Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130
S. Ct. 2971, 2985 n.11 (2010), as a “limited public forum.”
57. Perry’s reservation of the rule against content-discrimination to traditional and
designated public forums is, in contrast, easily explained by a theory based in
participatory democracy.
58. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
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exception, that the First Amendment places virtually no limits
on the authority of managers to discipline public employees for
the content of their workplace speech. The exception is for
speech is on a “matter of public concern,” expression eligible for
59
First Amendment protection. The nearly complete authority
that the Court gives workplace managers to regulate speech not
of public concern specifically belies specifically an
“incompatibility” standard for “institutionally-bound” speech.
More generally, such managerial authority over the content of
workplace speech is inconsistent with the view that the First
Amendment mandates respect for the formal autonomy of
government employees. In contrast, the availability of protection
for speech on matters of public concern, but not for other
workplace expression, fits snuggly with the view that
participatory democracy is the First Amendment’s primary
60
concern.
B. THE POOR OVERALL FIT BETWEEN FORMAL AUTONOMY
AND CURRENT DOCTRINE
Ed readily admits there are several important areas of the
law that contradict the view that free speech doctrine is based on
respect for formal autonomy. He writes, for instance, that
defamation law is “possibly the area where case law most
61
obviously contradicts” such a theory. Other areas that
62
63
contradict his theory include “fighting words,” copyright
64
obscenity and commercial speech.
With regard to obscenity, Ed is surely right that “[f]rom an
autonomy perspective, the issue is easy,” for “the right to
exercise ‘autonomous control over the development and
expression of one’s intellect, tastes, and personality’” would
plainly seem to embrace the right to produce, distribute, and
65
consume obscene material. But as Ed also correctly observes,
“existing doctrine denies protection to obscenity.” In contrast, as

59. Id. at 146 .
60. See Weinstein, supra note 2, at 493–97.
61. Baker, supra note 1, at 282.
62. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
63. See C. Edwin Baker, First Amendment Limits on Copyright, 55 VAND. L. REV.
891, 951 (2002) (arguing contrary to First amendment doctrine that “copyright generally
cannot be applied to limit noncommercial copying” consistent with the individual autonomy interests he believes the First Amendment protects).
64. Baker, supra note 1, at 272–74.
65. Baker, supra note 1, at 276.
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I have discussed at length elsewhere, and as Ed agrees, the
exclusion of obscenity from First Amendment protection does
68
not contradict a theory rooted in participatory democracy. With
respect to commercial speech, Ed argues that under his view of
formal autonomy there are multiple reasons “to deny protection
69
to commercial speech.” But contradicting any claim of doctrinal
fit with Ed’s theory, the Court has extended increasingly
70
rigorous protection to commercial advertising. A theory based
in participatory democracy, in contrast, at least offers a plausible
71
justification for this result.
The strong protection that current doctrine provides
abstract art and symphonic music, as well as private speech not
related to public issues, are areas where formal autonomy’s fit
with current doctrine is superior to democratic theory’s doctrinal
72
fit. But in light of all the other crucial areas of free speech
66. James Weinstein, Democracy, Sex and the First Amendment, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L.
& SOC. CHANGE 865 (2007) [hereinafter Weinstein, Democracy, Sex]; James Weinstein,
Free Speech Values, Hardcore Pornography and the First Amendment: A Reply to
Professor Koppelman, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 911 (2008) [hereinafter
Weinstein, Reply to Koppelman].
67. See Baker, supra note 1, at 277 (explaining that the denial of protection coheres
with “most political speech theories” including ones based in “participation in public
discourse”).
68. For an interesting argument that obscenity doctrine does interfere with
democratic participation, see Thomas M. Scanlon, Jr., Freedom of Expression and
Categories of Expression, 40 U. PITT. L. REV. 519, 544–46 (1979). For a response to this
argument, see Weinstein, Democracy, Sex, supra note 66, at 888–92.
69. Baker, supra note 1, at 272 (emphasis added).
70. See, e.g., 44 Liqormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
71. See Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L.
REV. 1. (2000). I, however, continue to think that promotion of the audience’s substantive autonomy interest provides a more forthright explanation for the protection of
commercial advertising. See James Weinstein, Fools, Knaves, and the Protection of
Commercial Speech: A Response to Professor Redish, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 133, 150–52
(2007).
72. As I discuss in the related symposium, with respect to the few areas where
participatory democracy cannot easily explain current doctrine, the problem is one of
incompleteness rather than inconsistency or contradiction. See Weinstein, supra note 2,
at 500. Unlike the massive contradiction that would attend any attempt to explain current
doctrine in terms of autonomy, formal or substantive, incompleteness does not
undermine doctrinal coherence. Rather, the failure of participatory democracy to explain
all of free speech doctrine can be explained by recognizing the undeniable fact that as a
descriptive matter several values inform American free speech doctrine. See id. at 497–
504. Admittedly, the existence of highly protected speech such as abstract art or
symphonic music is in tension with my descriptive claim that participatory democracy is
the only core free speech norm. My proposed solution for solidifying participatory
democracy as the sole core free speech norm is to protect exercises of formal autonomy
such as the creation of abstract art and symphonic music as well as intimate conversation
not related to matters of public concern as fundamental liberty interests under the Due
Process Clause, in accordance with the protection already provided kindred autonomy
interests under that provision. See Weinstein, supra note 2, at 499 n.45; Weinstein, Reply
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doctrine that have a poor fit with formal autonomy, including
the key areas discussed in Section A of this Part, the overall fit
between doctrine and formal autonomy is relatively poor,
especially as compared to the good fit between these crucial
areas and a theory grounded in participatory democracy.
In the related symposium, Ed made the astute observation
that we do not have an agreed upon metric to measure overall
73
fit. The absence of such a metric would indeed be a problem if
there were not such an obvious disparity between the fit of the
two theories we are comparing. Thus we might need a scale to
determine (and here I am afraid I am dating myself) whether
Orson Wells or Jackie Gleason was heavier; but we need no such
“metric” to confidently conclude that Gleason weighed more
than Willie Shoemaker. By the same token, if I am correct that
in such key areas as defamation, copyright, compelled speech,
obscenity, commercial speech and the scope and operation of the
rule against content discrimination, there is poor fit between
doctrine and formal autonomy; and if there is a much better fit
in most of these area with participatory democracy; then there is
no need for a sophisticated metric to conclude that a theory
grounded in participatory democracy fits doctrine better than
does a theory based on formal autonomy.
III. WHY FIT MATTERS
The demonstration that a theory grounded in participatory
democracy has a better overall fit with current doctrine than
does a theory based in formal autonomy raises the question of
74
why fit matters in judging the merits of a free speech theory.
This question is particularly pertinent here since Ed denies that
overall fit is relevant to such a determination. The answer to this
question depends crucially on what a theory of free speech
doctrine is meant to accomplish. If one is especially interested—
as I am—in bringing coherence to what otherwise might appear
75
to be largely a jumbled assortment of cases, the importance of a
to Koppelman, supra note 66, at 915 n.22. Ed charges that this move is “reminiscent” of
Alexander Meikeljohn’s extending the scope of his democracy-based theory to give it
better doctrinal fit, but which simultaneously diminished his theory’s “bite.” See Baker,
supra note 1, at 271 n.32. I do not believe the comparison is apt. Assigning the protection
of certain activity to another constitutional provision to which it more properly belongs
rather than to the First Amendment is quite unlike Meikeljohn’s expanding the scope of
the protection provided by his First Amendment principle to improve its doctrinal fit.
73. See C. Edwin Baker, Is Democracy a Sound Basis?, 97 VA. L. REV. 515 (2011).
74. See Baker, supra note 1, at 270.
75. As Robert has aptly observed, “first amendment doctrine is neither clear nor

!!WEINSTEIN-272-RESPONSETOBAKER3.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

WEINSTEIN RESPONSE TO BAKER

10/17/2011 9:26 AM

381

theory with good doctrinal fit is manifest. Such coherence will
increase doctrine’s clarity, stability, and administrability, benefits
76
that are particularly desirable in this area of the law. Of course,
any attempt to understand and organize case law requires
interpretation and judgment, and thus cannot be a purely
descriptive, value free exercise. Indeed, the pragmatic benefits
just described, as well as my attempt to organize free speech
doctrine around a single core principle so as to decrease judges’
ability to smuggle their ideological predilections into the
77
application of doctrine, are, at bottom, normative concerns.
Still, determining which principle best fits the pattern of the
decisions can and should be a primarily descriptive exercise.
This largely descriptive process of determining which theory
best fits contemporary doctrine is, however, only the first step in
deciding whether it is the best overall free speech theory. Overt
normative critique also has a crucial role to play in this process.
In interpreting an open-textured provision such as the Free
Speech Clause of the First Amendment, a morally repugnant
theory, or even a merely unappealing one, should be rejected no
78
matter how good the doctrinal fit. Similarly, if two theories fit
doctrine approximately equally as well, the more normatively
appealing one should be judged the best theory. Indeed, if one
theory is demonstrably more appealing than all others, than it
should be acclaimed the best theory even if it does not have as
good doctrinal fit as contending but less appealing theories. If
there is common ground for judging the normative appeal of two
competing theories, then it might be possible to determine which
theory is the more normatively appealing. But if two theories are
both appealing, though in different, incommensurate ways, it
would, as I suggested at the beginning of this response, most
likely be bootless to argue that one theory is more appealing
logical. It is a vast Sargasso Sea of drifting and entangled values, theories, rules,
exceptions, predilections.” Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First
Amendment, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 267, 278 (1991).
76. For a discussion of other advantages of good doctrinal fit, see Weinstein, supra
note 9, at 634–35.
77. One might also add that the largely unconscious exclusion of the host of
logically possible but morally or culturally unacceptable explanations of the data is also a
deeply normative process.
78. Thus although I do believe that doctrinal fit should have a significant role to
play in determining the best theory in various areas of constitutional law, this does not
require, as Ed seems to suggest, that one to be “an apologist for the status quo” or to
explain the “legal correctness” of morally repugnant cases. Baker, supra note 1, at 270.
See, for example, my explanation in the related symposium of why Citizens United v.
FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010), was wrongly decided. Weinstein, supra note 2, at 501 n.53,
504 n. 64, 510 n.85.
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than the other. In such a case, if doctrinal coherence and the
pragmatic benefits it brings are to be given any significant
weight, then among normatively appealing theories, the one with
the best doctrinal fit should be acclaimed the best overall theory
of free speech.
Ed agrees with Robert and me that the touchstone for
determining the normative appeal of a basic free speech
principle is how well it promotes political legitimacy. If, as I
attempted to show in Part I of this response, democratic
participation is more robustly connected with the promotion of
legitimacy than is formal autonomy, then as between these two
theories, one based in democratic participation is the better
theory of free speech, further enhanced by its superior doctrinal
fit. Ed might argue, however, that since his theory encompasses
participatory democracy and all the legitimacy it bestows, while
my theory excludes exercises of formal autonomy not related to
democratic participation and whatever contribution to
legitimacy it has to offer, then even on the assumption that
participatory democracy has a closer tie to legitimacy than does
formal autonomy, his more inclusive theory is necessarily more
appealing. In light of such demonstrable normative superiority,
the argument might continue, a theory based in formal
autonomy is the better free speech theory even if participatory
democracy can claim better overall doctrinal fit.
Significantly, however, my theory does not preclude
constitutional protection of formal autonomy; it merely denies
that this norm is, or should be, a core free speech principle.
Though I think it would be preferable if all exercises of formal
autonomy, including expressive ones, were dealt with exclusively
as liberty interests under the Court’s substantive due process
79
jurisprudence, I have no strong objection to the Court
extending First Amendment protection in appropriate cases to
expressive exercises of formal autonomy. However, because, as I
explained in Part I, restrictions on the wide range of expressive
activities embraced with Ed’s vision of formal autonomy will not
usually jeopardize the legitimacy of the legal system, I do
strongly disagree with his view that all expressive exercises of
such autonomy warrants “virtually absolute” First Amendment
80
protection. Accordingly, if political legitimacy is to be the
79. See supra note 72.
80. Baker, supra note 1, at 252. Which is not to deny that, in some respects, such a
broadly encompassing theory may have advantages over one more narrowly based in
democratic participation. For example, Ed’s autonomy principle might, even in its core
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primary criterion for judging the merits of a free speech theory,
one having a direct and robust connection with such legitimacy is
to be preferred to a contending theory that would extend
rigorous protection to a great deal of expression having little or
81
no connection to that norm.
But let’s assume for the sake of argument that the neither
theory is demonstrably more appealing than the other, but,
rather, that the most that can be established in a discussion
among informed observers such as this is that formal autonomy
and participatory democracy each, though in different ways,
supply very appealing bases for a theory of free speech. In that
event, if the interest in creating coherent, workable free speech
doctrine is to be given any significant weight, the question of
which principle has the superior overall doctrinal fit then
becomes determinative.

application, protect important liberty interests that would otherwise fall between the
cracks of my participatory democracy principle and the Court’s current substantive due
process jurisprudence. But this possible benefit is, in my view, more than offset by the
risk that massively extending the First Amendment to protect activity having little or no
connection to political legitimacy will dilute the protection available to activity such as
core political speech having a vital connection with the legitimacy of the legal system. For
a more detailed discussion of this dilution problem, see James Weinstein, Seana Shiffrin’s
Thinker-Based Theory of Free Speech: Elegant and Insightful, But Will it Work in
Practice?, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 385, 393–95 (2011). See also Weinstein, supra note 71, at
156–58.
81. Though its more vital connection to the promotion of legitimacy is primarily
what makes a theory based in democratic participation more appealing than one based in
formal autonomy, there is another advantage of political participation worth mentioning.
As Ed concedes, his vision of formal autonomy is “wildly contested” as a moral theory,
let alone a basis of free speech doctrine. Baker, supra note 1, at 269. In contrast, that
each citizen in this country has an equal right to participate in the democratic process,
including the right to voice her views on matters of public concern, is a proposition that,
to borrow Frank Michelman’s remark about democratic self-governance in general, “no
earnest, non-disruptive participant in American constitutional debate is quite free to
reject.” Frank Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1526–27 (1988). All things
being equal (and then some), basing free speech doctrine on a principle that attracts
near-universal acceptance from both legal actors and the American public will tend to
produce clearer, more certain and more stable doctrine in an area of the law in which
such attributes are particularly desirable than would basing doctrine on a wildly
contested principle. Ed writes that “the laws Congress (and individual states) pass
limiting political . . . speech” suggest that consensus that I claim about democratic
participation is “not so clear.” Baker, supra note 1, at 269. I am not sure what laws Ed
has in mind, for attempts to pass blatant viewpoint restrictions on public discourse are
nowadays rare, even at the state and local level. In any event, that politicians do not
always act in accordance with what they know to be a core democratic precept is neither
surprising nor disproof that there is in fact a clear consensus about that precept. Also,
that there is wide-spread consensus about a norm does not assure that there will always
be consensus either about its interpretation or application. Still, a principle reflecting a
widely-shared national commitment will be interpreted and applied with more clarity and
certainty that one based on a “wildly contested” norm.

